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Part. - (V)

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[illegible]—Joint Minute by the Revenue Member and the Minister for Local Self-Government, Punjab Government.

1. There is a great deal in Parts II and III with which we are in general agreement and it is only here and there that we feel it necessary to offer a comment or venture to differ on points of importance. The wide and varied administrative experience of the official Members extending over 34 years in one case and 29 years in the other, including the experience of the reforms administration in a province extending over 4 years in one case and over 2 years in the other has enabled them to deal with this difficult subject with a thorough grasp of its details, and it is perhaps on account of their great and varied experience that they are not unnaturally inclined to be more cautious than they would have been otherwise. While appreciative of the great development which has taken place in almost all the 'transferred' departments, describing it as the "outstanding characteristic of the reforms period," while acknowledging the fullest co-operation of all those to whom opportunities of co-operating were given, while placing on record on the whole markedly responsible way in which the Punjab Legislative Council has co-operated with the Executive and influenced it to carry on the administration more economically and more efficiently, thus giving signal proof that confidence can be reposed in its sense of responsibility, the official Members of Government have considered it necessary to place far reaching restrictions on their recommendations. This may possibly be due very largely to their very considerable administrative experience which, while an asset of the greatest possible value in matters of administration, cannot but ordinarily tend to make the efficient administrator err on the side of caution when formulating proposals of constitutional advance.

2. We agree with the official Members' comment in paragraph 3 of Part II, that Parliament has already divested itself of its responsibility for the good governance of India as regards the 'transferred' subjects; and with the official Members' enunciation of the test provided by Parliament, for determining the present advance regarding further divesting itself of its responsibility for the good governance of India, *viz.*, "the measure of co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service were conferred, and the extent to which it has been found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility." It has been said by His Majesty's representative in the province, His Excellency the Governor, in his addresses to the Legislature from 1921 onwards, that full measure of co-operation has been given to him by the Legislative Council and by the Ministers. It is also admitted on all hands that general development in the 'transferred' subjects has been phenomenal, and unprecedented during any period of pre-reforms Government. It is no doubt possible to argue that the same advance might have been achieved *if the administration had set itself to accomplish it.* But the fact remains that previous administrations did not set themselves to achieve it, and were not able to evoke that response from the public without which the great educational advance of the last 7 years would have been impossible. Avoiding thus the past time of conjecture in the domain of possibilities, and taking cognizance of facts, one cannot but come to the conclusion that the great success achieved by the 'transferred' departments has been due to the political awakening of the countryside and the Government being responsive to it and ready to meet the demands of the people—the two features of the reforms so well brought out in paragraph 4 of Part II.

3. During the course of their comments on the sense of responsibility shown by the elected representatives in the Legislative Council in the exercise of their vote, while acknowledging that at a critical period and at some risk too, they showed themselves ready to support Government in the taxation necessary to re-establish the finances of the province, the official Members point out (paragraph 7 of Part II) that the Council has *not always* shown itself able to keep an open mind in approaching those questions on which fashion has established a prejudice against the Executive Government. The words "not always" were undoubtedly intended to convey the meaning that in most cases the Council has been able to keep an open mind. This is indeed high praise when it is remembered that it has been earned during the non-co-operation period. It has been said that the Council has been prone to pay more attention to communal considerations than to the merits of the matter at issue. That is a criticism which is quite in fashion. Can it not be said of the official proposals in Parts II, III and IV that they pay more attention to communal

considerations than to the merits of the matter at issue. For a dispassionate consideration of the question—whether the reformed Council has paid more attention to communal considerations than to the merits of the matter at issue—it would be necessary to determine which matters were under consideration and what were their merits. Take the case of recruitment of services. How far is it fair to criticise the Legislative Council in this way, while the recruitment to the Indian Civil Service, as sanctioned by the Secretary of State himself, pays attention to communal considerations? How far can it be said that racial considerations do not influence the decision on the problem of Indianization? As a matter of fact do not racial and communal considerations form part of the merits of the many problems when they come before a Legislature or any other authority? Those affected by the decision of those problems are bound to concentrate on important considerations which form the merits of the matter at issue. Communal considerations have formed part of the merits of various problems which have been connected with the departments administered by the official Members themselves, including the recruitment of services in those departments; and this has been so in the reformed administration as it was in the pre-reforms administration. Again, the criticism that on many occasions the vote appears to have been unduly swayed by personal alliances or prejudices shows that their long administrative careers did not permit their working on large deliberative institutions in their own country or in Europe; but the members of the Commission will recall numerous instances where personal alliances or prejudices have swayed the Mother of Parliaments. Again, it is hardly fair, knowing that different sections of the House, balancing each other, enables the Executive Government to have its own way to a larger extent than would be possible otherwise, to complain that even balance of different sections of the House, with small bodies standing aloof, has made the Council at times appear inconsistent. The existence of such conditions may in no small measure be due to the constitution itself or to the action of the Executive. We have not been able to recall such incidents, but if there have been any, they are bound to be pretty few. Lastly, Ministers may at times have experienced some difficulty in knowing whether they can depend upon their party for the support on which they might legitimately have counted, but we are quite clear that such difficulties have not occurred more than once or twice during the last eight years.

4. Under the effect of the Reforms Scheme as a whole on the general administration of the province the official Members sum up as follows:—

(*i*) As regards law and order:—

(*a*) "Communal dissensions have led to open disorder and the Reforms Scheme is partly responsible for it." Communal dissensions did not come into prominence during the first three years of the reforms scheme, in fact they were the years of mutual goodwill during the non-co-operation period. Is it not more likely that as the non-co-operation movement *vis-a-vis* the Government weakened, it continued to function in communal dissensions? Such mass movements do not as a rule terminate as spent forces, but turn into something else before they are actually spent. The fact that since the appointment of the Royal Commission, the communal question has receded into the background, and the non-co-operation has revived, lends support to the view we venture to take.

(*b*) "Security services have suffered from the retirement of a large number of experienced officers, though a *considerable* portion of these retirements were only indirectly connected with the introduction of the reforms". This point is hardly relied upon by the official Members as a grievance against the reforms, because, as has been rightly admitted, a *considerable* portion of these retirements were due to the financial advantages which retirement on proportionate pensions offered to officers who were young enough to make a new start in England. In many other cases it was due to private reasons. It is also worth mentioning that as regards the Services of the Transferred Departments, so far as we recollect, not a single retirement took place on account of reforms, and a

case of retirement on proportionate pension was accompanied by the assurance that it was not the reforms, but the advantages of getting settled in England at a suitable age with the help of financial assistance that proportionate pensions rules provided, that led to retirement. We do not recollect any other case of retirement of members of all-India services so far as the Transferred Departments are concerned. It is therefore not fair to hold that the members of all-India services functioning in 'reserved' subjects had any reasonable occasion to retire on account of reforms, and were it not for the generous rules of retirement on proportionate pensions the difficulty complained of would not have been experienced.

(*ii*) The official Members admit that as regards other branches of work it would be unreasonable to say that there has been a general deterioration of standards since the introduction of the Reforms Scheme. What the Reforms Scheme has brought out is public voice, voice of the electorate, voice of the representatives of the electorates, and their voice naturally gives expression to their complaints relating to not only the policy of various departments but also relating to the way in which officials of various departments work. It is therefore obvious that from the increased volume of complaints it should not be understood that the evils have come into being only with the reforms scheme. With an enlarged Council, with a more representative Council and with an elected Council it is but natural that the grievances of the public be ventilated and the shortcomings of officials of Government brought to light and made much of. In other words, the reforms scheme administration has called for higher standards of honesty and efficiency and better treatment of the public, and to that extent has exposed defects in the administration. The same remarks apply to local bodies. The standards of efficiency and honesty that prevailed before the introduction of the Reforms Scheme, were not subjected to public criticism to the extent to which they are now being subjected, and so it is now being demonstrated that the public demand higher standards of administration, *i.e.*, higher standards of efficiency and honesty, and unless the Government is able to improve its standards the people will not be satisfied. In this connection official members have observed that there is a feeling in many of the provincial services that communal considerations are *now* allowed far more weight than before, not only in the matter of recruitment but in departmental judgments affecting their conduct and capacity. Those of us who have had experience of the pre-reforms Legislative Council and of the public life in the first decade of the present century administration, have heard these very complaints vigorously made before the Reforms Scheme. In fact they were present long before then. It is very likely that the official Members have been told, by some members of provincial services, their grievances against their officers of a different community. In Indian circles, especially in service circles, the belief prevails that European officers have submitted to the reforms rather than welcomed them, and therefore any disparagement of the same is not likely to displease them and may actually show how 'sensible and well-balanced mind' the complaining officer has. Several of us have had opportunities of controverting this belief, but it is so firmly rooted in their minds that it is no use arguing with them. We firmly believe that there has been no appreciable change in such matters and that complaints in that line have existed as long as our memory goes back.

5. The official Members' estimate of the degree to which political advance is actually desired by public opinion at large is fairly accurate. Advanced political parties demand complete provincial autonomy with responsible and representative Government, and with a Governor who is a replica of a constitutional sovereign of modern days. Less advanced politicians want provincial autonomy, but with a Governor who has more powers than a constitutional king. It

is to this class that politicians with minority interests belong. The official Members have shown not an unnatural solicitude for a considerable class whose territorial and social influence has been built up on the support of the present administration." This is a class which the politicans dub as reactionaries. Our experience is that this class has already proved itself to be adaptable and no apprehensions as to their future need be entertained. The very qualifications which helped them under the bureaucratic Government were not likely to forsake them during the Government established by the reforms. With them—"the king is dead : long live the king" is a constitutional truth which must guide all their activities, and during the last eight years they have done well. As regards those not directly interested in political questions they do not as a matter of fact 'think.' They are not the people who call for European element in services It is as a matter of fact the less advanced politician with community interests who considers a third party better than the opposite party.

It would be a mistake to assume that the demand for advance is not keen or considerable The countryside demand extended franchise, agricultural labourer is dissatisfied, the right of village officials, *lambardars*, *zaildars* and *sufedposhes* to domineer over others is being questioned, peasant propaganda has had its effect, the right thing to do therefore is to assume that the countryside will not be satisfied unless there is extension of franchise, leading to the establishment of a responsible government which will institute a sympathetic investigation into all their real or supposed grievances.

To sum up the Punjab has worked the reforms extraordinarily well. The Punjab has done so well that the advance secured to it should not be less than that provided for any other province. That is, we believe, the view from which official Members of Government do not dissent.

Lines of Advance.

6. We agree with the official view that the so-called lines of advance discussed in paragraph 16 of Part II are all out of question. In paragraphs 19—27 various 'reserved' departments have been brought under review and the perils of transferring them indicated If the present Transferred Departments were similarly examined it would appear that the perils are not less serious The apprehension that a rural majority will do away with land revenue and water rates is not well founded, because it is the countryside which needs development to reach the standard of development attained already in urban areas and this cannot be done unless revenues are forthcoming to secure that development. It is therefore in the interests of the rural majority to increase the revenues, and as recognised in paragraph 7 of Part II, the existing rural majority has already been tried and found worthy of confidence. The experience of 8 years of administration under the reforms enables us to give cordial support to the official proposal that all the departments be transferred.

7. In paragraph 15 of Part II four objections are urged against provincial autonomy :—

(*i*) Possibility of a community not being represented in Government.

(*ii*) Minority interests.

(*iii*) Absence of guarantees to Central Government and other provinces.

(*iv*) Undesirability of withdrawing from members of the service a position to which they can now look forward.

As regards the third, there is no such desire and the rules already made by the Secretary of State as regards 'transferred' subjects provide for them.

As regards the fourth, in the Punjab there was no Executive Council and the service had no opportunity of looking forward to an Executive Councillorship. Therefore, the mere fact that during the last 7 or 8 years there has been a service Executive Councillor creates no vested interests of any sort, which should for a moment be allowed to stand in the way of grant of provincial autonomy

As regards the first and the second, the possibility is there, but either on that ground provincial autonomy throughout India becomes impossible or has to be given in spite of these two objections It is obvious that on these two grounds the Punjab could not be accorded a treatment different from that accorded to other provinces.

8. In the latter part of paragraph 14 of Part II the constitutional question is propounded, and the last sentence of paragraph 18 sums up the position :—

> " Practical considerations dictate that in the purely provincial field Parliament cannot entirely divest itself of powers of supervision and control exercised through the Central Government ".

The subject is further developed in paragraphs 29-30 of Part II. This important matter is differently put in different parts of the Memorandum, and it is essential that the matter be put clearly and frankly. At present so far as the Transferred Departments are concerned the Government of India has been excluded from their administration, while Parliament has divested itself of its powers of supervision and control exercised through the Central Government. We have not understood the official Members to say that this divesting itself of powers by Parliament and investing the local Legislature with it should be rescinded. We believe that they could not have intended to be understood to put forward that view, because this is the one thing which will be resented all over India by people of all shades of political opinion. We find some difficulty in understanding the official proposal. It is clear that the present Reserved Departments are all to be transferred. Is it intended that as regards these departments Parliament should *not* divest itself of its powers of supervision and control exercised through the Central Government at present, though Parliament has already done so in the case of subjects transferred under the Act of 1919 ? We are quite clear that the divesting in this case by Parliament of itself of these powers of supervision and control and investing the local Legislatures with the said powers should be carried out in the same way and to the same extent as already done under the Act of 1919 and the rules framed under it. This is the main point on which we find ourselves in direct disagreement with the official Members. This transfer will be no transfer if the Parliament does not divest itself of the responsibility of supervision and control, and there would be no investing local Legislatures with that authority to which ministerial responsibility could be attached. If there is no complete transfer from the British Parliament to the local Legislature how can the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Council be a reality ? Is it proposed that those Members of the Cabinet who are in charge of the *newly* transferred subjects should owe a double responsibility, partly to the local Legislature and partly to Parliament ? Or are the powers of the Cabinet to be split up into two, part of it to be in charge of the Cabinet formed of the elected members of the local Legislature, and the remaining part to vest in the proposed ' service ' Member, who is to be a Member of the Cabinet ; the former being responsible to the local Legislature and the latter to Parliament. If so, then this transfer of subjects is of no value whatsoever, and it would be far better to have some of the subjects transferred, while others remain as reserved.

If by any chance it is intended that Parliament should go back on its divesting itself of powers of supervision and control as regards the subjects transferred under the Act of 1919 and that now all the subjects be under dual control, then this will result in a much worse dyarchy than the one which exists at present. In fact then dyarchy will run throughout the administration. Local Legislature will not be supreme in any department, and the powers of Parliament will be the same as in the pre-reforms period. We see no reason why the transfer of the Reserved Departments should not take place under the very conditions under which the present Transferred Departments were handed over to the reformed Government. It is not shown in what respects the Instrument of Instructions has been found to be insufficient. Local self-government and provincial autonomy cannot possibly prosper if the Secretary of State continues to exercise his " supervision and control " through the Central Government.

As regards " the method of control " discussed in paragraphs 39—40 of Part II, the following criticism appears to be cogent and relevant :—

(*i*) The provisions of the Act relating to the present transferred subjects and the Instrument of Instructions and the rules made under the rule making power of the Act have been found to be adequate, and so far as we are aware during the last 7 or 8 years no cases have arisen when they were found to be insufficient.

(*ii*) Why should the same provision not do for the subjects which are going to be transferred now ?

(iii) Constitutionally it is common ground that as regards the transferred subjects power of control passed from the British Parliament to the local Legislatures. If so, then the exercise of control by Parliament is meaningless, and therefore the question of method of exercise of control does not arise.

(iv) In paragraphs 39-40 Central Government figures largely. This is contrary to the existing constitution. As regards 'transferred' subjects, Central Government is not in the picture, except to the extent of bringing various provinces together for the purposes of mutual consultation.

(v) Once again, paragraphs 39-40 scrap the local Government and substitute the Governor in its place. Surely, if provincial autonomy means anything it means that the local Legislature is supreme and that the Cabinet responsible to that local Legislature constitutes the Government of the country subject to the position with which the law invests the Governor. So it will be the local Government that will be in communication with the Central Government or the Secretary of State and not the Governor in his personal capacity. Therefore, we are not in a position to appreciate conditions such as follows :—

(a) Certain *control* be exercised by Parliament and it be exercised through the Governor.

(b) Governor will be acting in a dual capacity :—

(i) as agent of Parliament exercising control over the local Government ;

(ii) as President of the Cabinet and part of local Government.

(c) Governor in future will be performing *in his own person* the obligations towards the Central Government which now fall on the Governor-in-Council.

(d) The advice or instructions of the Central Government will be conveyed *to him personally*.

This sounds more like a Resident in an Indian State.

(e) The Governor will be invested with statutory powers to intervene.

All this does not sound very well for the Cabinet which is to be responsible to the Legislature.

(f) On the ground that the Governor of the scheme will have much more increased responsibility than he has at present, and will have larger duties, it is claimed that he will need an official colleague. We may be pardoned for saying so, but it amounts to having a Deputy Governor, and this Deputy Governor must be a Member of the Cabinet, whose support the Governor will need when presiding over the Cabinet ; and from what is said in paragraph 40 it would appear that he is likely to have the portfolios of 'peace and good order' and 'finance'. But this is not all. He will not only deal with the two subjects which may be entrusted to him, but he is to have his finger in the pie of every Minister, including the Chief Minister, since there is to be a convention of joint working and he is to have the power to influence their views and policy, and so presumably he is to have his own views and his own policy. We are not told whose policy is to prevail when the Deputy Governor's policy differs from that of the Cabinet and what will be the situation where the Ministers differ and his vote constitutes the majority. To sum up, it appears that this official Member of the Cabinet is to have much wider powers than the present 'service' Member of the Executive Council. It further appears that the Governor of the future is to have much wider powers than he has at present. So it does seem strange that on the inauguration of provincial autonomy the number of service Members should continue to be the same, and their powers enlarged and yet it should be compatible with larger powers having been conferred both on the Ministers and the Legislature to the extent that provincial autonomy demands.

In part IV it is proposed that the official Member should also be an *ex-officio* member of the Legislature with a right to vote. It is not made clear whether he will vote as directed by the Cabinet or not. It is not stated whether he will have the right to remain non-voting on any subject on which the Cabinet is voting. It seems inconceivable that a 'service' Member be voting with the opposition and his remaining non-voting amounts very much to the same thing.

9. *The Position of the Cabinet.—Paragraph 41 of Part II.*—It is not made clear whether there is to be a Chief Minister or not, and if there is to be one whether he can hold meetings of his Cabinet whenever he likes, besides those over which the Governor presides. It is also not quite clear whether under the official proposals it is the Chief Minister who constitutes his Cabinet and submits the proposals as to the appointment of his colleagues for the Governor's approval or whether it is the Governor himself who appoints each individual Minister, and lastly it is not clear whether on the recommendation of his colleagues, a Member of the Cabinet can be excluded from the Cabinet.

10. We do not think that as regards charges on the consolidated fund, there is any need for devising a method of enforcing the disbursement of these charges on the Executive Government. The sanction behind it is the very Act under which the constitution has been created.

The suggestion in paragraph 38 of Part II is already being acted upon now, but under altered conditions 'Governor' would presumably mean the Cabinet.

11. *The Services—Paragraph 42 of Part II.*—This is a point on which Indian Political leaders hold very strong views, and there is considerable feeling in Indian circles on it.

(*i*) All services should be recruited by and kept under the Provincial Government. The only ones which might be considered for a different treatment are the Indian Civil Service and the Police Service. As regards these, their recruitment should continue to be in the hands of the Secretary of State; but as regards exercise of control over them that should be finally in the Public Services Commission.

(*ii*) As regards the existing proportionate pensions rules, they should continue. They are generous enough as it is, but we cannot support the official proposal recommending the extension of these rules. Having made a rule in 1919 to cover the present stage of advance there seems no justification for extending it again. Remembering that the existing rules have been abused, *i.e.*, put to uses other than those for which they were devised, it seems unfair to extend them. We do not know how many further stages of advance there are to be discussed in the future, and at every time when a particle of power passes from the British Parliament to the Indian people it is highly derogatory to India to have to consider the question of giving such options. The question was settled in 1919 and should not be re-opened again.

As regards the proposal in paragraph 44 it would be as well to establish a Public Services Commission, but we are not in favour of the members of provincial services having two authorities dealing with their appeals—the Public Services Commission and the Governor. On the establishment of the Public Services Commission it would not be necessary to continue appeals to the Governor.

The Constitutional Question—paragraph 1, Part III.

12. We are not quite clear as to the purport of the sentence: "We have assumed that in the case of the additional subjects now proposed to be transferred power would vest in the provincial Government in the same manner as it does now in the case of transferred subjects, that is, that power would be derived by direct delegation from the British Parliament to the Provincial Governments". There seems to be obviously some misapprehension on the subject. Constitutionally what has already taken place in 1919 is that Parliament divested itself of its powers of supervision and control in the case of certain specified subjects, then called transferred subjects. This seems to us a bit different from the British Parliament delegating certain powers to Provincial Governments. Provincial Government under the proposed provincial autonomy does not come into being till after the

creation of an electorate and an elected Legislature. So, Parliament having divested itself of powers of supervision and control, and having invested the local Legislature with the said powers, it is then that Provincial Government comes into being and derives its powers from the Provincial Legislature and the Statute.

13. We agree with paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Part III and emphasise the following :—

(*a*) " That *vis-a-vis* the Central Government Provincial authority should be absolute except where expressly limited by Statute ".

(*b*) " The revenues and property allocated by Parliament to a Provincial Government should be secured to it by Statute ".

As regards paragraph 5, the difficulties in the way of making rules seem to be so great that possibly doing away with previous sanction rules would be a better alternative.

14. We are in general agreement with the rest, but we are not quite in agreement with paragraph 29 of Part III. Surely, the control of provincial balances is essential.

Franchise as discussed in Part IV.

15. The conclusions of the official members are :—

(*a*) Franchise is governed by two considerations.—

***Firstly*, the manageable size of electorates ;**

***Secondly*, electorates should be large enough to be representative.**

(*b*) In rural areas the precentage of electorate to the population is 5·3, in urban areas 12·3, and this divergence is due to the existing franchise, *viz.*, admitting urban tenants to a vote, but not admitting rural agricultural tenants to a vote, and also to the franchise in urban areas for tenants being very low and the franchise for land-owners being high.

(*c*) Paragraph 6, last portion part IV.—"Extension of franchise will lead to extend the field of political consciousness generally, and the changes are not themselves calculated to have any marked effect on the constitution of the legislature. Neither will the class of persons newly enfranchised differ in any noticeable degree from those who at present possess a vote, nor is it likely that the extension of the franchise will have any effect on the class of candidates elected, though they may affect the volume of representation of various communities "

(*d*) Agricultural tenants should obtain a vote.

In view of the above conclusions the official proposals as regards franchise seem to be inadequate and open to criticism. They are :—

" that franchise for urban tenants be reduced from 96 to 72, and that in the case of landowners it be reduced from 25 to 20, and in the case of agricultural tenants the qualification be occupation of agricultural land which roughly pays Rs. 25 land revenue "

Further extension in these directions admittedly is not going to revolutionize the electorate nor the legislature, but is sure to extend the field of political consciousness generally and is going to give a right to those who value it, and who, according to the official Members, are as likely to exercise it well as others whom it is proposed to give. As to the manageable size of electorates what is needed is reduction in the territorial size of the constituencies. When a representative holds a meeting in a group of villages no harm is done if land-owners paying less than Rs. 20 land revenue are present. We therefore propose that the land-owning qualification be reduced from 25 to 10 ; and urban property qualification be reduced from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 2,000. Our reasons are :—

(*i*) as regards urban qualification, that a vote is allowed to an occupier of property of which the rent is Rs. 72. Surely you can't refuse the owner of that property a vote on the basis of that property, and the value of that property is not likely to be Rs. 4,000 or Rs. 3,000, but is more likely to be Rs. 2,000.

(*ii*) As regards rural franchise, taking the urban franchise as Rs. 72, the agricultural tenant who pays his land lord Rs. 72 a year for occupation

the land revenue portion of Rs. 72 is seldom more than Rs. 12. We would therefore fix Rs. 12 as the agricultural tenant's qualification, and in the case of the agricultural landowner we would fix Rs. 10 land revenue as his franchise.

What we have suggested above is probably the least that would satisfy the province. Claims for adult franchise are being pressed by certain politicians, but our suggestions above, though not meeting that demand, would go a considerable way in working up to it.

16. The present constitution of the Legislative Council as given under paragraph 8 part IV needs a word of explanation. There are but 71 elected seats, and it would have been as well to give their distribution separately and then to add nominated seats to them. Moreover, there seems no adequate reason for splitting up the nominated seats into two parts, 3 of the European, Anglo-Indian and Christian communities being given under the percentage, while the remaining five not being included in it. Distributed communally the elected 71 seats are divided as follows :—

Muslims	34
Hindus	23
Sikhs	13
Christians	1
Total	71

So the position is this.

In general electorate Muslims have 50 per cent.

In general electorates *plus* "special interests" they have 34 out of 71, or 47·8 per cent.

Add nominated seats and they have 36 out of 79 or 45·56 per cent.

It will thus appear that as we move from general electorates to "special interests" and then to nominations their 50 per cent. is reduced to 45·56 per cent. This the Punjab Muslims have considered as a grievance and a very real grievance against Government. Under the Lucknow Pact they got 50 per cent. and Government has proceeded to reduce that 50 per cent. to 45·56 per cent.

17. Official proposals are that the official *bloc* should disappear so far as voting in the legislature is concerned. We are prepared to support this recommendation.

18. There is no definite recommendation as regards the institution of "nomination," but so far as we have been able to gather all communities and classes are very strongly against nominations. Nomination is at present resorted to in favour of depressed classes. Now the official proposal is that it is not necessary to have them separately represented and we agree to it. Nomination is therefore restricted to representation of industrial Labour, of military classes, Indian Christians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Now Indian Christians and Europeans and Anglo-Indians have definitely asked for discontinuing nominations. There is no reason why industrial labour should not have a seat by election, and as regards the military element our general electorates have been returning military men in every Council, and giving them an All-Punjab constituency will be doing them a disservice, while nomination is objected to on principle. Thus nomination as an institution should be done away with except that of experts in the matter of technical bills as mentioned in paragraph 21 of Part IV.

19. 'Special interests" then consist in University, Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Baluch Tumandars, one each. There are at present three constituencies for large landowners allotted one to each community, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. It is now proposed to raise this number to 4 giving 2 to Muslims and 1 each to Hindus and Sikhs, in view of the large number of Muslim voters under this qualification. In other "special interests" constituencies communal considerations are excluded. Muslims have for a long time claimed to have a seat earmarked for Muslims in the University, but this has never found favour with the authorities. It is possible to open these 'large landowners' special interests constituencies to non-communal electorates splitting up the province into various territorial divisions

more or less on the basis of the voting strength of that constituency. This would give 4 constituencies, Rawalpindi Division and Multan Division both having very large preponderance of Muslim voters and Lahore Division and Jullundur-cum-Ambala Division, both constituencies having very large preponderance of non-Muslim voters. This gives 8 "special interests" constituencies and a 9th one for industrial labour. The communal distribution of these 8 will be—

Hindus	3
Muslims	3
Sikhs	
Christians	
Total	8

20. *What should be the strength of the Council.*—79 being the present strength of the non-official members of the Council a fifty per cent. advance would raise it to 120, and we do not think 125 would be too large. Having disposed of 72 seats, 64 of the existing general electorates and 8 of the revised "special interests," and a 73rd for industrial labour, we are left with 52 additional seats. According to the present system of separate electorates the question is how should these 52 seats be divided between different communities. We are prepared to support the official proposal that the Christians should continue to have their one seat and Europeans and Anglo-Indians their two. Out of 73, Muslims have 35 and non-Muslims have 37, with the labour seat being yet indeterminate. The Council of 125, whether under the Lucknow pact or the minimum demand of the Indian Muslims keeping in view the larger representation given to Muslim minorities in other provinces could not have less than 63 Muslims: they have got 35, and therefore it is obvious that they should have 28 out of the 52 additional seats, and of the remaining 24, three will go to Christians, and the 21 distributed between Hindus and Sikhs. It may be noticed that the distribution of seats between communities closely follows the official proposals.

21. *Mode of representation.*—The official members reject proportionate representation and we agree with them. We agree with their rejecting territorial constituencies in such a manner that a system of open voting would be likely in ordinary circumstances to give each community representation corresponding to its population. They have examined the proposal of reservation of seats for each community combined with election by open voting. This has not been dealt with at full length, because the franchise is not yet determined and it is impossible to say how far the system can work till the figures of franchise have been prepared. In the existing franchise Muslims cannot possibly accept this method because their voting strength is 42 per cent. and there will be earmarked seats for Muslims in constituencies wherein non-Muslim voters preponderate. This is tantamount to giving a constituency, wherein conservatives preponderate, a direction that they should return a labour member.

22. *Constituencies—Rural and Urban.*— At present constituencies are of two kinds, rural and urban. Urban constituencies consist of towns with population of 10,000 or above. All other areas go to make rural constituencies. In the countryside, it is desired that small towns with population of 5,000 or above should be excluded from rural constituencies and included in urban constituencies and necessary adjustment of the relative strength of urban and rural constituencies be made. The view expressed in the last sentence of paragraph 18, part IV relating to district constituencies is not supported by facts. The franchise not having been determined it is impossible to assert that they would be preponderatingly rural in complexion. Facility of polling, organized political institutions, well financed, the struggle between the urban and rural may end in the swamping of the rural in the elections. Any proposal to amalgamate rural and urban constituencies will create feelings of resentment in the countryside. It will be considered an attempt to swamp rural constituencies and to bring the countryside into conflict with the better organized, better financed urban political organizations. The proposal may be attributed to the desire of the British Government not to give the countryside a majority in determining their future, so that the taxation which is pressing heavily on the rural population may, with the help of urban members, be retained and the difficulty of finding other resources not have to be faced. As regards additional

seats it would be as well to give some seats to urban constituencies in excess of their due rather than virtually break down or tend to break down the distinction between rural and urban constituencies. Therefore, the alternative method of district constituencies with open electorates but reserved seats will be strongly objected to :—

Firstly by Muslims because it will deprive them of separate electorates; and

Secondly by rural people because it introduces urban areas into rural constituencies.

22. There seems to be a great deal of confusion as to the term "majority community". In the Punjab, in official documents, Muslims are described as the majority community. In non-Muslim political pamphleteering a great deal of argument is based on Muslims being a majority community in the Punjab and yet demanding protection. It would be as well here to state what this majority does consist in :—

(*a*) As regards numbers Muslims constitute roughly 55% of the population.

(*b*) As regards voting strength under the existing franchise for the Legislative Council they constitute 42% of the total electorate and are thus distinctly in a minority so far as the machinery set up by the Reforms Scheme is concerned. If the method of election is to be by open voting in joint electorates then surely Muslims will be the minority community with 42% or 43% status. Is it intended that because of the franchise being what it is, because of the comparative economic or financial backwardness of Muslims, an administration be set up in which the Muslims, though in population a majority community, so far as administration goes should be under the non-Muslim majority in the legislature and in the administration ?

(*c*) In the non-official portion of the legislature they are already in a minority —45·56%. Is it intended that they should continue to be in a minority, or are they to be in a majority in proportion to their population or at all events in a bare majority ?

(*d*) As regards administration there are departments in which their representation is extremely inadequate. There is now no department, except in the lowest sections of the Police and Jail Departments, as constables and watchmen, where they are in a majority because the pay fixed for these is too low to attract non-Muslims. In the administration as a whole their representation is below even 40% (a copy of the census of Government servants is attached herewith).* In what way then can it be said that the Muslims constitute a majority community and therefore they have no right whatsoever to oppose joint electorates, while the franchise is so fixed as to make them a minority community and their economic condition and lack of political organisation places them at the mercy of the *sahukars* and the political propagandists ? Under the Reforms Scheme this backward community has awakened from its stupor. Is it intended that they should have a chance of developing and be in a position to discharge their responsibilities to themselves and to their country or to lapse into further economic disabilities and consequent political disability ? It is not in the interests of any State to let a large community like the Muslims in the Punjab become educationally and economically so backward as to be a menace to the State.

23. The representation of various communities on the legislatures is determined by the rules under the Government of India Act which were largely based on the Lucknow Pact which still holds the field inasmuch as the Unity Conference proposals have not secured the acceptance of the people concerned. It is well understood that a pact is a pact till the parties to that pact cancel it. It is also a fact that solemn pledges given by Viceroys and the British Government in the matter of separate electorates to Muslims cannot be departed from without serious consequences to the retention of confidence not only in the Muslim mind but in the Indian mind. It is much to be regretted that the conditions prevailing in the country have been such as to prevent various communities adjusting their differences amicably and again

* *Vide* Appendix.

presenting a unanimous decision to the Commission, as was done in the case of the Reforms Enquiry. Under the circumstances it is but natural that the officials and even the Commission should hesitate to recommend *radically* altering the principles on which the representation of various communities and classes on legislatures is determined or introduce modes of election for a community to which the said community strongly objects.

24. In the controversy relating to separate electorates it is often urged that separate electorates create communal majorities whether given to a minority community or to a majority community. There is a great deal of force in this criticism, but it should be remembered that the representative of a separate electorate is not necessarily a communal minded person, otherwise several Indian leaders, elected members of the Legislative Assembly belonging to Hindu and Muslim communities, would be altogether shorn of their nationalistic robes. Is it not possible to disarm the critics by so revising the rules of election as to make members of other communities eligible for election in separate electorate constituencies. If a Muslim constituency prefers to be represented by a Hindu and if a Sikh constituency by a Muslim there should be no bar in the way of this being done. If a candidate belonging to one community has the confidence of a constituency of another community, *prima facie* he should not be prevented from being returned by that constituency. This modification *if acceptable to all the communities*, will certainly remove the objection of creating communal majorities in the legislatures. This modification amounts to guaranteeing a certain number of separate constituencies to certain communities, but does not guarantee any seats on the legislature to any community. If the outlook of the people ceases to be communal this modification will make it possible for the change to be reflected in the representatives elected.

(Sd.) FAZL-I-HUSAIN,
Revenue Member, Punjab Government.

(Sd.) FIROZ KHAN NOON,
Minister for Local Self Government, Punjab.

SIMLA;
The 22nd August, 1928.

PART V.—MINUTE BY THE MINISTER FOR EDUCATION, PUNJAB GOVERNMENT.

This note is written with direct reference to Parts II, III and IV of the Memorandum prepared for the use of the Indian Statutory Commission by the Punjab Government, constituting volume II of the Government's Memoranda. The volume has been here for shortness called the Official Memorandum.

It need only be added that the proposals contained in the Official Memorandum were framed after discussion between the official and non-official Members of Government, and I have in my note called attention only to substantial points of difference.

Double quotation marks indicate words taken from the Official Memorandum.

(Sd.) MANOHAR LAL,
Minister for Education, Punjab Government.

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1. Delimitation of the spheres of the Central and the Provincial Governments.

Discussions of a theoretical nature as to where in working out schemes of provincial autonomy sovereignty should reside are not likely to be fruitful even if they had any formal validity in the constitutional position of India. Sovereignty in the legal sense vests in the Parliament to use a condensed expression, and the powers of the Central Government as of the provincial governments must be matters of derivation from the Parliament. The future of the Government of India, *i.e.*, such as may emerge as the result of the Royal Commission's inquiries and report, is to be determined by an Act of Parliament, and we need look no further to what the position might be if Parliament were to renounce all connection with India, and India were left to work out her own constitutional destiny by such primal and foundational processes by which such destinies are determined. But in attaining the ideal of responsible government within the provinces, use is constantly made of expressions such as 'autonomy', 'constituent governments in a federated union' that have implications other than legal which deserve consideration. The idea of provincial autonomy has attractions, it is undoubtedly true that in any properly limited provincial field the knowledge and interest available within the province must work for efficiency of administration, and, if sectional forces were not at work, lead to increased general welfare, but it will be a sad situation if as a consequence the already numerous schismatic tendencies in Indian life were to acquire an accession of strength by reducing the provinces into separate sealed units, and the growing national sentiment of comparatively recent origin, should thereby suffer any check. In devising the provincial spheres of government, this fundamental consideration that bonds of nationhood should not weaken must be constantly borne in view as the most essential test. The provinces are creatures of executive fiat for administrative reasons, and in trying to attain self-government through these somewhat artificial units our supreme loyalty to India as a whole must not in any form or degree be strained or violated. India does not represent a composite state based on a union of distinct political entities, there is no federation here formed of a union of component sovereign states as in the United States of America. Nor does the pursuit of such a federal ideal by deliberately clothing provincial governments with any marks of sovereignty lead to the realization of what the political conscious India desires.

2. The Official Memorandum has proceeded to examine the separate spheres of government—Central and Provincial—from the practical point of view and without expressing any political theory. With much of what is said there I find myself in substantial agreement, and I accept the general principle that the relative positions and spheres of the Central and the provincial governments respectively should be clearly defined by Statute, but in view of the fundamental consideration to which reference has been made above, I feel considerable difficulty in accepting the recommendation that all "residuary powers not defined as vesting in the Central Government should vest in the provincial and not in the Central Government"

Vide Part III, paragraph 2.

3. As regards the recommendations relating to the Financial field, I am prepared to accept the position defined in paragraph 16 regarding the power to levy

Part III, paragraphs 6 *et seq.*

surcharges on Central taxes analogous to the *centimes additionels* on the Continent, but I can not support the view at the end of paragraph 21 that the Province should be authorised "to impose taxes on incomes in a category below the minimum taxed by the Government of India". A disparity in the system of income-tax between the various provinces is obviously open to grave objections, such taxes are not only likely to be evaded, but calculated to injure trade and industry in a province. Nor are the political consequences of placing such a power in the hands of a legislature predominantly rural and non-income-tax-paying to be ignored. The system of income-tax, including as an essential factor an exemption minimum, must be uniform throughout the country—a departure from this well accepted principle will be economically without warrant and politically undesirable.

4. I find myself in general accord with the Official Memorandum Part II dealing with proposals for the introduction of Responsible Government within the provincial sphere and propose to express my views only briefly.

5. Now that the Statutory Commission is to examine afresh the whole constitutional position of India the Preamble to the Act of 1919 cannot be said finally to prescribe the objective: we can view matters from a more comprehensive point of view, and give full effect to the political aspirations of the people of India, so far as that does not in any way conflict with the primary and essential conditions of peace and tranquillity of the country.

6. In paragraph 3 I am disposed to give much greater credit to the Reforms with the 'new atmosphere' that they provided than the Official Memorandum has done.

7. Paragraphs 7 and 17. I have tried to examine the position with the utmost care but I have failed to discover in the last seven years any real beginnings of organization on party lines. "The predominent lines of cleavage are still communal", though an effort has been made to give it a political tinge; "there is not in sight any prospect that a general election will result in any turnover of votes" seriously affecting the position of the party of the majority. In other words no 'swing of the pendulum' is possible. There is no possibility of a regular alternation of Government. The position of class divisions is rigidly fixed: each party remains an intransigent *bloc*. The main issue is and remains 'who shall govern the State' and not 'how shall it be governed,' and this issue is resolved at once by an established majority along non-political lines. The condition of affairs on this vital matter is further described with lucid emphasis in paragraph 17. "The electorate at the moment thinks and acts communally—until the communal factor ceases to be paramount the most stable parties" (if so they be called) "will be fundamentally communal." "The result is that the Parliamentary system under which one party gives place to another on account of a change of allegiance on the part of a portion of the electors or their representatives will have in the near future no counterpart in the Punjab". The Official Memorandum while recognising that this position is "to some extent stereotyped by the fixation of the proportion of seats on a communal basis" says that it is not based on the system—the dominant factor that is responsible for this is the existence of actual communal cleavage. This last opinion I am not prepared to accept in its entirety. The present system enshrines a non-political principle in the bosom of the constitution itself, and the critics declare that the makings of parliamentary government do not exist in India. There may be justification for arranging representation on communal or other non-political lines, but as long as such provisions last it seems to me that lines of communal cleavage must retain their sharp character and even become deeper; and *pro tanto* genuine party system based on policy rather than class divisions, factions and interests cannot grow up; and if there is agreement on one matter among political philosophers and writers on forms of governments it is on this that for the proper working of the representative principle in a responsible form of government the party system is absolutely essential. Our Official Memorandum does not pay enough real regard to this basic factor and proceeding with the situation as it is lays down that "certain checks must be imposed to prevent it (the system of Government in the Punjab) becoming merely a mask behind which is enthroned a permanent majority of a communal colour". The real solution, if India is to be raised to a genuine democracy, with the principle of representation

Paragraph 7, page 5.

which is the very being of this form of government in real operation and having a proper party system based on principles and policies as determinants of government, is probably to be found along such general lines as the recent report of what is known as the Nehru Committee suggests (I do not wish to be understood as accepting the recommendations of this Committee in any detail, as I have not had an occasion to see the Report except in newspaper extracts, and there are several opinions there which I would any how find very difficult to accept). But if the present system is to continue in substance because fairly general acceptance cannot be obtained to any considerable approach to open elections or for any other reason, the question arises: are the checks suggested in the Official Memorandum proper and adequate? Here we have to consider (*i*) what is defined in paragraphs 18 to 27 in this Part of the Memorandum and (*ii*) the recommendations made for Franchise and Electorate in Part IV.

8. As to (*i*) the demand of the people is definitely expressed that the transference of the present reserved subjects to the Ministers should not form any occasion for increase, however indirectly, of the power of the Executive as represented by the Governor. The ultimate responsibility to the Parliament that "cannot entirely divest itself of its powers of supervision and control exercised through the Central Government" should not be the means of clothing the Governor with any further powers in the matter of subjects now transferred, and his powers in the subjects to be hereafter transferred should be placed on the same footing, otherwise ministerial responsibility will be unreal, and an element of irresponsibility indirectly introduced. I can foresee difficulties, which indeed are set forth in paragraph 22 which deals with safeguards under Law and Order and Police, but I think the general principle enunciated above should be respected. Paragraph 30 of the Memorandum is pertinent to this matter and restricts by Statute the Governor's powers. It does not give a constitutional governor the demand of the advanced section of political India—but I understand it is not intended in any manner to enlarge his existing powers.

9. In examining the implications of responsible Government in the Province on the executive working of Government among objections from the administrative point of view emphasis is laid on the scheme depriving the Executive of the services of a representative with official experience, and comparison is made with conditions in England where charge of ordinary administration is left in the hands of men of the status of "permanent officials." I consider this objection has less validity than the Memorandum attaches to it. There is no reason why we should not develop a more stable secretariat in our provinces than exists at present. We have no permanent officials for one reason or other, no one remains attached to a post or office for any considerable period, but that is a fault that can be in large degree set right, and with advancing Indianization of services becomes less and less irremediable. At any rate the position of such an official colleague as sketched in paragraph 40 would constitute such a grave anomaly in an otherwise responsible Cabinet that with the utmost desire to sympathise with the official point of view I do not find it possible to support the suggestion. In substance I apprehend it tends to let in dyarchy indirectly, a result which is in contradiction with the general trend of the proposals accepted in the Official Memorandum.

Part II, paragraph 15, page 11.

10. In regard to (*ii*) *i.e.*, official proposals for the Franchise and the Electorate—I do not think they tend in any substantial measure to weaken the forces making for communal cleavage, or afford effective checks for preponderance of communal influence. The present system that stereotypes communal seats with separate electorates is justified and its continuance recommended. As I view the matter, and the Official Memorandum and the Descriptive part of the Government's Memorandum abundantly bear me out, the present system has failed to weaken the forces of communalism, if it has not actually intensified them, nor has it furnished any true alinement of political parties. The experience of the past seven years should be a warning against all perpetuation of an anti-political arrangement and even if it appear true that the dominant factor of actual communal cleavage is likely to drive members of different communities into communal parties, a system that is erroneous in principle, if we have democratic government in view, and has not succeeded in practice, should be abandoned.

Part IV.

11. (*a*) But coming to particulars except in so far as adherence to the general principle of manhood suffrage regarded by some as essential to democratic government may compel in this direction, there is no sufficient case made out in the Official Memorandum and of course no appeal to such principle exists in the Memorandum for extending the franchise beyond the present qualifications. The considerations which led to the existing qualifications still continue in operation, and the small increase proposed in the number of seats does not justify making the constituencies any heavier or more unmanageable than they are now. The limits imposed by conditions of literacy, use of voting power, an intelligent attitude towards the value of the vote remain very much where they were. A close study of real political life furnishes no evidence in support of further extension of franchise. The electors' votes are said to be cast in rural constituencies largely on tribal or personal considerations, and it cannot be pretended that the proposed extension will have any different effect, the nature of representation will not be influenced.

12. This, however, does not probably apply strictly to the case of tenant franchise and apart from the political repercussions of such a right of which it is not possible, at any rate for me, to speak with any confidence or certainty, on general grounds the right must be conceded, and the practical difficulties in extending the franchise to agricultural tenants do not appear to be insurmountable.

13. If the rural vote is to be thus increased, and the constituencies to be made to that extent even more difficult to nurse and cultivate, the case for otherwise adding to the rural register becomes still weaker.

14. (*b*) On the communal question also I do not find the official proposals acceptable. In my opinion, if full effect cannot be given to natural forces or to use the precise language of the Memorandum, if "we cannot proceed with complete freedom towards a reconstruction based on theoretically correct canons of representation" and we are in the present examination bound by that assumption, there is no adequate reason why the system of separate electorates should be maintained. In the Punjab the insistence on separate electorates is made by only one of the three principal communities, and that the community that is in the majority. It is hardly necessary to argue that such a claim on the part of a majority community can have no foundation in principle, and I am not impressed by considerations of expediency set forth in paragraph 7 at page 38 and elsewhere in the Memorandum.

Paragraph 7 *et seq.*

15. As regards the relative communal strength in general constituencies the present position is that of the 64 seats, 32 are held by Muhammadans, 20 by Hindus, and 12 by Sikhs. This proportion should in my view be maintained irrespective of seats representing special interests : of the elected seats representing these interests, two are necessarily Muhammadan, one Hindu and one Sikh. Here again the proportion in the general electorates so far as Muhammadans as against the Hindus and Sikhs is not disturbed. But in addition to these there are three special seats (*i*) University, (*ii*) Industry, and (*iii*) Commerce. The third has during the last three elections gone to a European Christian but the first two to Hindu candidates. It is, however, erroneous to consider these as Hindu seats, for the seats are not reserved and non-Hindu candidates can stand and do compete and influence election, and the constituencies are non-communal and presumably affect representation. It is not consonant with the ideal towards which we must work and do claim to work to reduce the very few non-communal non-reserved seats that we have into terms of communal seats.

16. I have not referred to the three nominated seats to which allusion is made in paragraph 8 at top of page 39 which go to three Christians. They should be excluded from any useful reckoning of the kind made in this paragraph, because while these seats go to a community without any relation to its population strength they affect equally the relative positions of the three principal communities—in fact affect the Hindu and the Sikh ratios more seriously.

17. In my opinion the balance now obtaining between the seats held by the various communities should not be disturbed when new seats are added, and in determining this balance no account should be taken of the special seats referred to above. It must be noted that apart from other considerations one strong justification for this view is that it represents a rough compromise between the

population strength and the present voting strength of the various communities. Nor can we forget that the abolition of the official *bloc*, recommended in the official proposals, takes away an important factor of protection from the minorities; simultaneously to increase the relative numerical strength of a homogeneous majority community is to place the several minority communities in a grave position of weakness. The result would inevitably be the enthroning of a permanent majority of a communal colour in political power against which the checks were to be devised.

18. I am personally anxious to give the depressed classes, so often referred to in official documents as the objects of our special care and concern, some distinct representation, apart from the privilege of partial enfranchisement as to some extent falling in the category of tenants, but I feel the force of the difficulty of realizing this object pointed out in paragraph 10 at page 39. I fully support the inclusion of a seat for industrial labour. A further seat is recommended for Muhammadan Landholders for which I have failed to discover any adequate justification in the Memorandum. It is to be noted that at present there is in addition to a seat for Muhammadan landholders an exceedingly small constituency of a special class of Muhammadan Landholders—the Tumandars consisting of ten electors. If it is held desirable to give the widespread Muhammadan landholder any seat, the most appropriate course would be to utilise this special seat for the purpose. The Muhammadans of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, to which the Tumandars belong, have a seat in the Council at present.

19. It is not necessary for the purposes of this general note to enter into any further detail. These are matters on which individual communities will undoubtedly press their particular claims. I have only referred to certain general considerations which must be borne in mind if we are not to stereotype *anti*-political class and communal divisions, taking us away from the path of democracy and parliamentary government, a road which political India has made up its mind to tread, and an experiment which Britain has of deliberation taken in hand. Our aim should be to help in creating that temperament and attitude without which a constitution frankly adapted from Britain must remain a misfit and without which the stresses and strains of party conflicts must inevitably spell disruption and failure. This is the supreme and one valid test that any proposals for franchise and electorates must satisfy.

SIMLA;

The 22nd August 1928.

(Sd.) MANOHAR LAL,

Minister for Education, Punjab Government.

PART V.—MINUTE BY THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, PUNJAB.

Towards Democracy.—I may begin by mentioning that I am a plain man from country side and we the village folk are more concerned with the working of the constitutional machine, than the constitution making. It is therefore with some diffidence that I venture to make a few observations on the Memorandum which my official and non-official colleagues have prepared for the Commission.

The movement towards democracy is based on the recognition of the fact, " that no long hereditary line, be it of kings, or be it of peasants, can maintain a steady level of excellence through many generations ".

It is futile to think that Indian interests can be served by the revival of the old hereditary system of autocratic rulers or even by the bureaucratic rule which preceded the reforms. Their day is done. India and England have both changed.

India has seen the vision of Self-Government and will accept nothing less, and England can no more send the type of men who served India and England with a devotion which has been rarely paralleled. A commercial age has little use for men of this rare stamp. It is my considered opinion that there is no alternative but to raise India to the position of a self-governing unit within the Empire.

The Task before the Commission.—The task before the Commission is to assess the success of our transitional constitution, to diagnose its defects and to remove them, without impairing efficiency of the administrative machine, and finally to lay down the lines of further advance. The descriptive note which we have jointly prepared amply proves that there is nothing in the temper and the character of the people which can make the working of representative institutions impossible.

The communities, no doubt, are still guided into denominational groups and it must be admitted that the transitional constitution has emphasised these differences. The Commission must proceed with a deliberate determination to eliminate elements which have brought communal groups to the fore in the reformed constitution and work for the obliteration of communal cleavage.

The Commission, if it could read the heart of India, will find an immensity of good-will, rare in an alien people and this must bring home the grave responsibility that rests on the Commission. What is the Commission going to leave behind : treasured good-will stored by generations of British administration freely flowing or stirred and transformed into torrents of ill-will ? The Commission can leave peace or seething discontent behind.

The Franchise.—The foundation of every constitution is Electorate. I feel that if we lower the franchise further, we will run some risk of creating confusion, make it difficult for right kind of people to be elected to the Council. I am therefore against lowering the franchise any further : but if other considerations make the extension of franchise inevitable it should be lowered no further than the limit fixed by my official colleagues.

India is easily a hundred years behind England ; and England only within the last few years has enfranchised its adult population. The result of this new experiment cannot be foreseen : it may even undermine solid foundations of British constitution. In our case, it would be altogether dangerous to enfranchise the entire adult population and thus allow free play to elements which have yet to realise the meaning of responsibility. In the earlier stages of our development it is desirable that the intelligent and stable elements of society should find representation, that vested interests should be safeguarded, and representation of all communities provided in such a way that no community or interest can predominate the other. I advocate a fairly high property franchise, providing representation according to the voting strength of each community ; and giving reserved seats to any community that is likely to fail in finding its proper representation. The Council should be so balanced that no community can dominate the other till the three communities merge into one.

Special consideration.—The official Memorandum accepts the present communal cleavage and is content to leave representation through communal electorate as hitherto, in alloting seats to various communities in the Council. The principle is accepted by the Hon'ble Revenue Member and the Hon'ble Minister for

Local Self-Government, who plead for lowering the franchise still further in conformity with the democratic principles, while defending the undemocratic communal representation. The franchise is not to embrace the entire adult population, but seats in the Council are to be provided on population basis ignoring the voting strength of other communities entirely. It is proposed to abolish the official *bloc* and to replace it by 28 new seats. The authors of the scheme are driven by the logic of the facts to recommend that these new seats should be from a common electorate. This is all to the good, but as they proceed they feel that a common electorate may disturb the balance of communal parties and immediately provide that even the majority community should have reserved seats. It would have been more logical if reserved seats were provided for minority communities. Indeed, the scheme provides what the authors apprehend the enthronement of a permanent majority of communal colour. If the franchise is based on property basis, then the only logical way which would lead to the mingling of the various communities would have been to provide representation according to the voting strength of each community, and if it was considered desirable that any community should have a few more seats in addition to those provided by its voting strength these could be specially provided. If these proposals are accepted by the Commission what would happen is that the people who contribute and produce the most will be in minority in the Council. Just imagine what would have happened in England if a hundred years ago, the House of Lords was abolished and an adult franchise introduced, the result in the Punjab cannot be less disturbing. I venture to say that any new scheme must provide—

(*i*) for the gradual growth of nationality.

(*ii*) the formation of parties in preference to communal groups.

(*iii*) the promotion of a larger understanding between various communities to serve the common weal.

The Electorates.—The object of the new constitution is the growth of nationality and the gradual realisation of a democratic system of Government. Need I point out that communities that insist on communal representation are inconsistent in their demand and that communal representation is anti-national. It would not be altogether wrong if further advance was made conditional on the dis-appearance of communal groups. Take the Punjab; the three communities—Muhammadan, Hindu and Sikh—can govern only by becoming politically one community, but as long as they persist in claiming communal sufferage, there is no alternative but to balance the three communities by artificial and temporary arrangements, so that the non-communal character of the Council may be preserved. As no agreement has been reached by the communities, I think the solution suggested, by my official colleagues, seems to be the best: that the present representation may remain on communal basis, but additional representation should be through a common electorate, so that while we maintain a separate electorate in conformity with the wishes of the communities at the same time we make a start with a common electorate and thus provide for the ultimate disappearance of communal groups. The two systems working side by side will prove which is the best suited to our conditions.

The credit for finding this working arrangement is due to my official colleagues, but they have not carried their proposals to their logical conclusions. The halting proposal to reserve seats on a communal basis has nothing to commend it and may without hesitation be condemned. The line of advance for all additional seats is a common electorate. The majority community have no real misgivings, it cannot have it both ways, and is only bargaining for power, while it can find power only by winning confidence of other communities. To my mind no one who is truly communal is fit to occupy the seats of power.

The scheme prepared by His Excellency the Governor and the Finance Member will work well if communal representation is confined to the old elected seats, and all additional seats are given to a common electorate. If this is not done I may be permitted to say that the scheme is likely to accentuate communal differences and make the growth of a national Government distant and uncertain. I can definitely say that this arrangement will find acceptance by all communities and that the apprehensions of our official colleagues are not well-founded. It is

very easy to lay out plans, and to allocate various communal spheres but far-sighted statesmanship requires that larger interests of the country should prevail over communal interests leading to greater harmony, good-will and breaking-of the barriers which help the formation of communal groups and that the constitution should provide for the final triumph of nationality.

The Sikhs.—The position of the Sikhs is altogether peculiar in the Province. They make only 11 per cent. of the population, but they ruled the Province before the British annexation. Their voting strength entitles them to about ¼th of the representation in the whole Province. They have fought for the Empire in its far-flung battlefields. They may at any moment be called upon to serve as sword-arm of the Punjab, when other communities may remain dormant or uninterested. I have absolutely no hesitation in saying that the Sikhs will not be satisfied and will fight for their rights as they fought before, unless their position in the consitution is fully safeguarded. Indeed in the descriptive note which the Punjab Government has submitted, it has been admitted that the Sikh troubles were due to the neglect of the Sikh claims. I hope the same mistake will not be repeated again.

Sikhs are prepared to make no claim whatsoever if communal representation is abolished, but if communal representation remains, they are not prepared to accept domination of any community established in authority by an outside influence reducing them to a subordinate position. Therefore if communal representation is going to remain all the three communities must be so balanced that no one community can dominate the others. The simplest thing would be to allow representation according to voting strength of all the three communities and wait for further growth of nationality, when all communities by mutual agreement are prepared to abolish communal representation and accept adult franchise. The danger at present is that powerful minority communities are to be placed in a position of subordination by an outside authority and this is neither just, fair nor equitable. What the Sikhs' position is in the Punjab the Muhammadans' position is in the neighbouring province of the United Provinces.

The Cabinet.—There are two great objects which every constitution must endeavour to attain ; it must win confidence and loyalty of the people and through it gain authority and then use this authority without any discrimination of race and creed. If the Council is so constituted that it secures balanced union of the three communities and provides for the mingling of the aristocratic and democratic elements, leading to stability and good Government, there can be no question as to its success.

I have no hesitation in agreeing with my colleagues that all subjects should be transferred and that the Cabinet should be jointly responsible to the Legislature. The official Memorandum has not made it clear whether there is to be a Chief Minister who will choose his colleagues or in early stages the Governor is to perform the dual function of a Governor and the Prime Minister. I see no great objection at the present stage to allow the Governor to preside over the Cabinet and to act as Prime Minister and select his Cabinet : but I feel strongly that there should be a provision in the Act for the separation of the two functions and coming into power of a Prime Minister who enjoys confidence of the country. The position of the official Minister would certainly be anomalous but it is difficult at the present stage to deny that he is not wanted. There is much in life which is not altogether logical and many refinements of pure theory are find no place in rough practices of life. I feel that the Statute should provide for the representation of all the three communities as well as the fourth, the Europeans in the Cabinet of the Province. I am strongly of opinion that the Cabinet should have the power of dissolving the Council, so that need for co-operation between the Council and the Cabinet may be fully established. The salary, leave rules and privileges of the Ministers should also be fixed by Statute.

The power of the Governor.—The Governor, if official recommendations are accepted in early stages, will be acting in dual capacity.

(1) as Agent of Parliament,

(2) as President and part of local Government.

I feel that as long as he presides over the Cabinet all his actions should be, as now, as that of the local Government, which means the Governor-in-Council, and

when the functions are separated, then alone he could be personally in correspondence with the Central Government: till then I am in entire agreement with the Hon'ble the Revenue Member that the present practice should continue.

Delegation of Power.—I am definitely of opinion that there should be direct transfer of power from Parliament to the Province, as in the case of transferred subjects at present, and I am in complete agreement with the views expressed by the Hon'ble the Revenue Member and the Hon'ble Minister for Local Self-Government in paragraph 8 of their note, except in the matter of official Minister, whose presence I do not object to. I am also in agreement with their paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 and I am in agreement with the views expressed by the Hon'ble Minister for Education in his note in paragraphs 17 and 18.

The Services.—**I am of opinion that the Services should be protected, as on them rests the grave responsibility for the continuity of policies and that the Public Services Commission should be appointed.**

Conclusion.—**Lastly, I feel I must emphasise the need of common electorates, based on property and educational qualifications, the need for the representation of all the four communities, Muhammadans, Hindus, Sikhs and Europeans in the Cabinet to help the growth of national self-government. I feel a Council of 105 to 125 will meet the needs of the Province. The franchise can have no other object but that of creating a good and intelligent Council and an efficient Cabinet, representing all the special opinions and even special prejudices, giving an advocate for every particular sect and at the same time leaving the general body of the Council truly national, homogeneous and judicial in character like the laws it enacts. It is to this end we must jointly endeavour.**

Subject to the above remarks I am in general agreement with the opinions expressed by my official colleagues, the Hon'ble the Revenue Member and the Hon'ble Minister for Local Self-Government in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of their Minute.

JOGENDRA SINGH,

Minister for Agriculture, Punjab.

SIMLA, EAST;

The 28th August 1928.

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PART I.

Reserved Departments.

PART I.—Reserved Departments.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				Indians.								Percentage to column 3.					Percentage on column 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
	Executive Branch.																	
1. Punjab Civil Service	(a) Listed appointments ...	6	...	2	1	...	1	...	...	...	2	...	50	16·7	...	33·3	33·3	66·7
	(b) Ordinary appointments	237	15	87	15	17	61	20	19	...	3	6·3	43	32·9	16·5	1·3	52·3	47·7
	Grand Total ..	243	15	89	16	17	62	20	19	...	5	6·2	43·2	32·5	16·1	2	51·8	48·2
	Judicial Branch.																	
	(a) Listed appointments ...	7	2	2		...	3	...	...	..	...	28·6	28·6	42·8	..	...	28·6	71·4
	(b) Ordinary appointments...	168	1	37	21	3	78	6	17	...	5	·6	34·5	48·2	13·7	3	27·4	72·6
	Grand Total ...	175	3	39	21	3	81	6	17	...	5	1·7	34·3	48	13·1	2·9	27·4	72·8
	Provincial Service.																	
2. Police Department .	(a) Deputy Superintendents of Police.	50	8	20	5	1	10	3	3	...	...	16	50	22	12	...	48	52
	Subordinate Service.																	
	(a) Inspectors	*136	25	33	15	8	31	12	9	...	1	18·6	35·8	29·1	15·7	·8	39·5	60·5
	(b) Sergeants ...	31	31	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(c) Sub-Inspectors ...	†866	...	365	99	84	174	91	41	2	5	...	53·9	30	15·3	·8	63	37
	(d) Head Constables ...	‡2,861	...	1,553	441	216	426	137	92	1	1	..	69·8	22·5	7·6	·1	66·7	33·3

	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	2	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	50	...	...	...	50	...	100
	(b) Head Assistants ...	4	...	...	1	...	2	...	1	...	...	...	25	50	25	...	...	100
	(c) Stenotypists ...	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(d) Assistants ...	14	...	4	2	1	7	...	...	...	...	...	42·9	57·1	...	...	35·7	64·3
	(e) Senior Clerks ...	25	...	6	2	1	13	...	2	...	1	...	32	56	8	4	28	72
	(f) Junior Clerks ...	40	1	10	6	1	21	...	1	...	...	2·5	40	55	2·5	...	27·5	72·5
	(g) Auditors ...	3	...	...	1	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	33·3	66·7	...	...	33·3	66·7
	(h) Munshis ...	3	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	100
	GRAND TOTAL ...	4,037	68	1,991	575	313	685	243	139	3	9	1·7	63·7	24·8	4·5	·3	33·3	36·7
	Constables ...	§17,202	...	13,077		3,140		922		11		...	72·2	18·3	5·4	·1	...	...
3. Public Works Department, Irrigation Branch.	Special posts ...	9	7	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	77·8	22·2	...	...	...	22·2	77·8
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(a) Punjab Engineering Service.	102	16	2	7	4	60	7	6	...	...	15·7	8·8	62·8	12·7	...	12·7	87·3
	(b) Deputy Collectors ...	33	...	13	5	1	8	1	4	...	1	...	54·5	27·3	15·2	3	45·5	54·5
	(c) Sub-Engineers ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(d) Temporary Engineers ...	40	17	5	1	3	12	1	1	...	...	42·5	15	37·5	5	...	22·5	77·5
	(e) Temporary Assistant Engineers.	7	1	1	1	1	2	1	...	...	...	14·3	28·6	42·8	14·3	...	42·9	57·1
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Upper Subordinates ...	48	...	3	3	1	35	2	4	...	...	...	12·5	75	12·5	...	12·5	87·5
	(b) Subordinate Engineering Service.	294	1	37	32	10	151	29	34	...	...	·3	23·5	54·8	21·4	...	25·9	74·1
	(c) Lower Subordinates ...	86	...	9	14	4	45	3	11	...	...	...	26·7	57	16·3	...	8·6	81·4
	(d) Zilladars	216	...	70	30	14	49	32	19	...	2	...	46·3	29·2	23·6	·9	53·7	46·3

*Includes 2 vacancies. †Includes 5 vacancies. ‡Includes 4 vacancies. §Includes 52 vacancies.

PART I.—*Reserved Departments*—continued.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				Indians.								Percentage to column 3.					Percentage on column 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
	Clerical Establishment.																	
2. Public Works Department, Irrigation Branch—*contd.*	(a) Superintendents and Head Clerks.	95	7	17	13	1	51	1	5	...	...	7·4	31·6	54·7	6·3	...	20	80
	(b) Other clerks ...	523	13	100	85	21	268	5	25	...	6	2·5	35·4	55·3	5·7	1·1	24·1	75·9
	(c) Draftsmen (including tracers).	241	1	54	81	4	74	10	15	...	2	·4	56	32·4	10·4	·8	28·2	71·8
	(d) Acting clerks and draftsmen.	393	1	66	79	20	195	7	24	...	1	·3	36·9	54·7	7·8	·3	28·7	70·8
	Petty Establishment.																	
	(a) Patwaris (including Mirabs).	2,326	...	594	257	91	1,078	147	157	...	2	...	36·6	50·2	13·1	·1	35·9	64·2
	(b) Munshis ...	540	...	142	84	37	206	33	37	...	1	...	41·9	45	13	·1	39·2	60·7
	(c) Cashiers ...	6	...	...	1	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	16·7	83·3	...	...	...	100
	(d) Storekeepers ...	28	...	3	...	1	19	3	1	...	1	..	10·7	71·4	14·3	3·6	25	75
	(e) Artificers ...	191	...	19	58	4	41	2	66	...	1	...	40·3	23·6	35·6	·5	13·1	86·9
	(f) Signallers ...	480	...	59	95	6	280	21	18	...	1	...	32·1	59·6	8·1	·2	17·9	82·1
	Grand Total ...	5,659	64	1,196	846	223	2,580	305	427	...	18	1·1	36·1	49·6	12·9	·3	30·5	69·5

4. Forest Department.	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(a) Extra Assistant Conservators.	33	...	5	1	2	17	5	3	...	...	...	18·2	57·6	24·2	...	36·4	63·6
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Forest Rangers ...	66	...	17	9	11	15	4	10	...	...	...	39·4	39·4	21·2	...	48·5	51·5
	(b) Deputy Rangers ..	45	...	12	6	17	5	3	2	...	...	...	40	48·9	11·1	...	71·1	28·9
	(c) Foresters	141	...	41	12	58	25	3	2	...	...	...	37·6	58·9	3·5	...	72·3	27·7
	(d) Forest Guards ...	909	...	325	58	248	139	24	15	...	...	...	42·1	53·6	4·3	...	76·7	23·3
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	3	...	1	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	33·3	66·7	...	...	33·3	66·7
	(b) Head Clerks ...	24	...	3	5	3	11	...	1	1	...	...	33·4	58·4	4·1	4·1	29·1	70·9
	(c) Clerks	121	...	33	14	19	45	1	4	1	4	..	38·9	52·9	4·1	4·1	44·6	55·4
	GRAND TOTAL ...	1,242	...	437	105	458	259	40	37	2	4	...	40·4	53·4	5·7	·5	69·8	30·2
5. Land Revenue Department.	(a) Tahsildars ...	*102	...	53	7	8	24	3	5	1	1	...	58·8	31·4	7·8	2	63·7	36·3
	(b) Naib-Tahsildars ...	*174	...	65	13	19	50	17	19	...	1	..	44·8	39·6	14·9	·7	58	42
	(c) Kanungos ...	779	...	312	87	63	255	35	26	...	1	...	51	41	8	...	53	47
	(d) Patwaris ...	9,563	...	3,480	936	1,027	3,210	459	270	144	37	...	46	44	8	2	54	46
	GRAND TOTAL ...	10,618	...	3,910	1,043	1,117	3,539	514	310	145	40	...	46·6	43·8	8	1·6	53·6	46·4
6. Law Department ...	(a) Government Advocate ...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Assistant Legal Remembrancers.	2	...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	50	50	...	...	50	50
	(c) Public Prosecutors ...	28	...	6	4	1	14	...	2	...	1	...	35·7	53·6	7·1	3·6	25	75
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendent ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	..	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(b) Head Clerk ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(c) Clerks	10	...	2	1	...	5	...	2	...	...	...	30	50	20	...	20	80
	GRAND TOTAL ...	43	1	9	5	1	22	...	4	...	1	2·3	32·5	53·5	9·3	2·3	23·3	56·7

* Vacant posts filled up temporarily are not included.

PART I.—Reserved Department—continued.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE ON COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
7. Jails Department ...	(a) Superintendents of Jails	17	1	5	2	...	7	1	1	...	...	5·8	41·2	41·2	11·8	...	35·3	64·7
	(b) Deputy Superintendents	3	1	1	...	...	1	..	...	...	...	33·4	33·3	33·3	...	...	33·3	66·7
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Jailors	22	1	6	2	1	12	...	...	...	...	4·5	36·4	59·1	...	...	31·8	68·2
	(b) Deputy Jailors ...	7	...	2	...	...	3	1	1	...	...	...	28·6	42·8	28·6	...	42·9	57·1
	(c) Accounts Staff ...	20	1	2	2	...	14	...	1	...	...	5	20	70	5	...	10	90
	(d) Assistant Jailors ...	90	...	17	12	3	41	3	14	...	...	...	31·9	49·4	18·7	...	25·3	74·7
	(e) Head Warders and Warders.	1,660	...	901	298	163	205	64	25	1	3	...	72·2	22·2	5·4	·2	68	32
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Head Assistants ...	3	1	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	33·4	33·3	33·3	...	...	33·3	66·7
	(c) Stenographers ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(d) Assistants ...	2	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(e) Head book Inspector ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(f) Book Inspector ...	2	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(g) Senior clerks ...	6	...	...	1	...	4	...	1	...	...	...	16·7	66·7	16·6	...	...	100
	(h) Junior clerks ...	9	...		1	1	7	...	...	...	...	...	11·1	88·9	...	...	11·1	88·9
	GRAND TOTAL ...	1,844	6	935	318	168	301	69	43	1	3	·3	68	25·4	6·1	·2	68·6	36·4

8. Reclamation Department.	(a) Superintendents ...	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Assistant Superintendents	2	...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	50	50	...	...	50	50
	(c) Probation Officer ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(d) Manager ...	1	...	...	...	...	..	..	..	...	1	...	..	...	...	100	...	100
	(e) Agricultural Assistants	3	...	...	..	...	..	2	1	..	...	...	...	...	100	...	67	33
	(f) Sub-Assistant Surgeons	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	..	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(g) Store-keepers ...	3	...	...	...	1	2	..	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	33·3	66·7
	(h) Sub-overseers ...	1	...	1	..	...	...	..	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(i) Muqaddams ...	6	...	4	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	66·6	33·4	...	...	100	...
	(j) Teachers ...	4	...	1	..	2	1	...	...	...	...	...	25	75	...	...	75	25
	(k) Dispensers ...	1	...	...	...	..	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(l) Instructors ...	9	...	1	3	1	4	...	...	...	...	...	44·4	55·6	...	...	22·2	77·8
	(m) Warders ...	15	...	4	4	3	3	...	1	...	...	...	53·3	40	6·7	...	46·7	53·3
	(n) Blacksmiths ...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	100
	(o) Carpenters ...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	100
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Stenographers ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	..	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(b) Clerks ...	9	...	3	2	1	3	...	...	...	...	...	55·4	44·6	...	...	44·6	55·4
	GRAND TOTAL ...	61	2	18	10	10	15	2	3	...	1	3·3	45·9	41	8·2	1·6	49·2	50·8
9. Criminal Tribes Department.	(a) Divisional Criminal Tribes Officers.	2	...	1	...	...	1	...	...	..	...	...	50	50	...	..	50	50
	(b) Overseer ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(c) Supervising staff ...	34	...	5	4	6	9	4	5	...	1	...	26·5	44·1	26·5	2·9	44·1	55·9
	(d) Teachers and Preachers	16	...	3	2	1	2	2	2	...	4	...	31·2	18·8	25	25	37·5	62·5
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(b) Clerks	16	...	...	6	...	8	1	1	..	...	...	37·5	50	12·5	...	6·2	93·8
	GRAND TOTAL ...	70	...	9	12	7	22	7	8	4	5	...	30	41·4	21·4	7·2	32·8	67·2

PART I.—*Reserved Department*—continued.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE ON COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
10. High Court ...	(a) Gazetted Ministerial Officers.	3	2	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	66·7	...	33·3	...	...	...	100
	(b) Superintendents ...	8	1	...	1	...	4	...	1	...	1	12·5	12·5	50	12·5	12·5	...	100
	(c) Clerks	181	4	34	39	3	84	8	7	...	2	2·2	40·3	48·1	8·3	1·1	24·9	75·1
	COURTS SUBORDINATE TO THE HIGH COURT.																	
	(a) Head Clerks ...	51	...	12	14	...	24	1	...	...	...	...	51	47	2	...	25·5	74·5
	(b) Other clerks ...	1,158	6	274	230	83	498	13	49	1	4	·5	42·5	50·2	5·4	·4	32	68
	GRAND TOTAL ...	1,401	13	320	234	86	611	22	57	1	7	·9	43·1	49·8	5·6	·6	30·6	69·4
11. Punjab Civil Secretariat.	Special posts	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	10	4	1	...	...	4	...	...	...	1	40	10	40	...	10	10	90
	(b) Personal Assistants and Stenographers.	14	...	2	3	...	5	..	2	...	1	...	35·7	35·7	21·5	7·1	14·3	85·7
	(c) Assistants	39	9	1	5	1	17	2	2	...	2	23	18·4	46·2	10·3	5·1	10·3	89·7
	(d) Senior Clerks ...	34	1	7	4	2	19	...	1	...	...	3	32·3	61·7	3	...	26·5	73·5
	(e) Junior Clerks ...	18	...	8	3	...	5	...	1	...	1	...	61·1	27·7	5·6	5·6	44·4	55·6
	(f) Restorers	8	...	1	2	3	1	...	1	...	...	...	37·5	5·0	12·5	...	50	50

	PRESS BRANCH.																	
	(a) Superintendent ...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Senior Translators ..	7	...	2	1	...	3	...	1	...	...	...	42·8	42·8	14·4	...	38·6	71·4
	(c) Junior Translators ...	10	...	4	5	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	90	...	10	...	40	60
	GRAND TOTAL ...	143	16	26	24	6	54	2	10	...	5	11·2	35	41·9	8·4	3·5	23·8	76·2
12. Office of the Director of the Bureau of Information, Punjab.	PROVINCIAL SERVICES.																	
	(a) Director	1	..	1	...	...	...	...	..	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Assistant Director ...	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	100	...
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendent ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(b) Clerks	7	...	4	1	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	71·4	14·3	14·3	...	57·1	42·9
	GRAND TOTAL ...	10	...	6	1	1	1	...	1	...	...	...	70	20	10	...	70	30
13. Punjab Government Printing.	GOVERNMENT PRESS.																	
	(a) Superintendent ...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Deputy Superintendent	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(c) Assistant Superintendent	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	..	...	100
	(d) Clearing Officer ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(e) Clerical establishment ...	46	1	13	6	4	21	1	...	...	...	2	42	54	2	...	39	61
	(f) Technical establishment	397	10	130	145	29	76	6	1	...	...	3	69	26	2	...	42	58
	CENTRAL JAIL AND BORSTAL INSTITUTION PRESSES.																	
	(a) Works Manager ...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Clerical establishment ...	10	...	3	3	...	2	1	...	1	...	...	60	20	10	10	40	60
	(c) Technical establishment	18	...	5	8	1	3	...	1	...	...	...	72	22	6	...	33	67
	GRAND TOTAL ...	476	15	151	162	34	103	8	2	1	...	3	66	29	2	...	41	59

PART I.—*Reserved Department*—concluded.

1	2	3	4	5													7	
				Indians.								Percentage to column 3.					Percentage on column 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
14. Office of the Financial Commissioners.	(a) Superintendents ...	5	2	...	1	...	2	...	.	...	...	40	20	40	..	...	...	100
	(b) Assistants ...	20	3	6	4	...	7	...	...	...	...	15	50	35	...	...	30	70
	(c) Stenographers ...	4	...	...	2	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	50	50	...	...	...	100
	(d) Senior Clerks ...	12	...	3	2	1	5	...	1	...	...	...	41·6	50	8·4	..	33·4	66·6
	(e) Junior Clerks ...	29	...		7	3	6	2	4	...	...	...	48·3	31	20·7	...	41·4	58·6
	Grand Total ...	70	5	16	16	4	22	2	5	...	...	7·2	45·7	37·1	10	...	31·4	68·6
15. Office of the Director of Land Records.	(a) Superintendents ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(b) Head Assistants ...	3	...	...	...	1	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	67	33	...	33	67
	(c) Stenographers ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	..	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(d) Clerks	13	...	7	...	...	5	1	...	...	...	...	53·8	38·5	7·7	...	61·5	38·5
	Grand Total ...	18	...	9	...	1	6	1	1	...	...	...	50	38·9	11·1	...	61·1	38·9
16. Ambala Division [Commissioner's office and District offices in the Division].	(a) Superintendents and Head Clerks.	7	6	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	85·7	14·3	...	...	...	14·3	85·7
	(b) Clerks ...	468	1	108	71	68	189	7	13	...	11	·2	38·2	54·9	4·3	2·4	39·1	60·9
	Grand Total ...	475	7	109	71	68	189	7	13	...	11	1·5	37·9	54·1	4·2	2·3	39·7	61·3

PART II—Transferred Departments.

A.—Ministry of Agriculture.

PART II—TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS.

A.—Ministry of Agriculture.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE OF COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
Department of Agriculture.	Special posts ...	8	4	...	1	...	2	...	1	...	...	50	12·5	25	12·5	...	...	100
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(a) Provincial Civil Service	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	..	100	...	...	...	100
	(b) Provincial Agricultural Service,	36	...	13	1	4	7	10	1	...	...	...	38·8	30·6	30·6	...	75	25
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Agricultural Assistants ..	196	1	63	1	19	37	63	11	1	...	·5	32·7	28·5	37·8	·5	74·4	25·6
	(b Mukaddams ...	274	...	170	6	38	6	49	3	1	1	...	64·2	16·1	18·9	·8	94·1	5·9
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	2	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	50	...	50	50	50
	(b) Head Assistants ...	3	...	...	1	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	33·3	66·7	...	...	...	100
	(c) Head Clerks ...	9	...	5	1	1	1	...	1	...	...	...	66·7	22·2	11·1	...	66·7	33·3
	(d) Clerks ...	108	...	26	20	6	40	3	10	...	3	...	42·6	42·6	12	2·8	32·4	67·6
	Technical establishment ...	69	...	18	28	4	11	2	5	1	...	...	66·7	21·7	10·1	1·5	36·2	63·8
	GRAND TOTAL ...	706	5	295	59	72	108	127	32	4	4	·7	50·2	25·5	22·5	1·1	70·5	29·5

2. Veterinary Department.	(a) Provincial Veterinary Service.	21	2	8	2	...	5	3	1	...	..	9·5	47·6	23·8	19·1	...	52·4	47·6
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Veterinary Inspectors, Assistant Surgeons and Veterinary Assistants.	335	...	124	57	28	40	56	28	...	2	...	54·1	20·3	25	·6	62·1	37·9
	(b) Technical subordinate establishment.	45	1	13	14	3	8	4	2	...	...	2·2	60	24·4	13·4	...	44·4	55·6
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Head Clerks ...	6	..	1	...	1	3	...	..	...	1	...	16·6	66·7	...	16·7	33·3	66·7
	(b) Clerks	29	...	7	4	3	13	...	2	...	...	...	37·8	55·2	7	...	34·5	65·5
	GRAND TOTAL ...	434	3	152	77	35	68	63	33	...	3	·6	52·7	13·8	22·2	·7	57 6	42·4
3. Department of Fisheries.	(a) Warden of Fisheries ...	1	1	..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Superintendent of Fisheries.	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(c) Inspector of Fisheries ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	..	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(d) Sub-Inspectors of Fisheries	8	...	4	...	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	50	50	...	...	75	25
	(e) Deputy Sub-Inspectors of Fisheries.	6	...	3	2	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	83	17	...	...	67	33
	(f) Laboratory Assistants ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Head Clerk ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(b) Clerks	2	...	...	1	1	..	...	...	...	...	...	50	50	...	...	50	50
	GRAND TOTAL ...	21	1	8	3	4	5	...	...	...	...	5	52	43	...	...	57	43
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
4. Co-operative Societies Department.	(a) Deputy Registrars ...	2	...	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	50	...	50	...	100	...
	(b) Assistant Registrars ...	17	...	10	1	1	1	4	...	...	...	...	65	12	23	...	88	12

PART II—TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS—*continued.*

A.—Ministry of Agriculture—continued.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3					PERCENTAGE OF COLUMN 3	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
4. Co-operative Societies Department—*concld.*	(x) Inspectors	103	...	57	3	24	4	14	...	...	1	...	58	27	14	1	92	8
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	100	...	100
	(b) Clerks	177	...	77	20	29	24	18	6	1	2	...	55	30	13	2	71	29
	GRAND TOTAL ...	300	...	145	24	54	29	37	6	1	4	...	56·3	27·7	14·3	1·7	79	21
5. Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch.	Special posts	17	8	...	2	...	7	...	...	...	...	47·6	11·9	40·5	...	...	...	100
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(a) Punjab Service of Engineers.	25	2	2	...	3	16	...	1	...	1	8	8	76	4	4	20	8
	(b) Sub-Engineers ...	11	2	1	1	...	4	1	2	...	...	18·2	18·2	36·4	27·2	...	18·2	81·8
	(c) Temporary and Assistant Engineers.	22	1	4	1	2	11	1	2	...	...	4·5	22·7	59	13·6	...	31·4	68·6
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(i) *Buildings and Roads Branch.*																	
	(a) Upper and Lower Subordinates and S. E. S.	83	...	14	14	1	40	4	10	...	...	...	33·7	49·4	16·9	...	34·9	65·1

Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch—*contd.*	(b) Draftsmen (on the regular cadre).	40	1	8	13	...	10	...	8	...	...	2·5	52·5	25	20	...	20	80
	(c) Tracers (on the regular cadre).	10	...	2	3	...	4	...	1	...	...	...	50	40	10	...	20	80
	(d) Subordinates (not on the regular cadre).	2	1	...	1	...	21	3	3	...	...	3·4	3·4	71·4	21·8	...	10·3	89·7
	(e) Surveyors (not on the regular cadre).	2	...	1	1	...	...	...	...	..	...	...	100	...	..	...	50	50
	(f) Draftsmen (not on the regular cadre).	32	1	14	7	...	6	...	2	...	2	3·1	65·5	18·8	6·3	6·3	43·8	56·2
	(g) Tracers (not on the regular cadre).	11	..	3	1	..	6	1	...	...	...	.	36·3	54·5	9·2	...	36·3	63·7
	(ii) *Maclagan Engineering College.*																	
	(a) Lecturers	6	...	...	1	1	3	1	.	...	..	...	16·6	66·8	16·6	...	16·6	83·4
	(b) Assistant Demonstrators	5	...	1	...	...	3	.	...	...	1	...	20	60	...	20	20	80
	(c) Mechanics ...	4	...	1	3	...	...	...	...	...	..	..	1·0	...	...	..	25	75
	(d) Lecture Assistants ...	4	...	1	1	...	1	...			.	...	50	25	25	...	25	75
	(iii) *Engineering School, Rasul*																	
	(a) Instructors ...	4	...	3	..	1	...	..	1	...	...	..	75	...	25	..	75	25
	(b) Workshop establishment	8	1	4	2	..	1	...	...	...	..	12·5	75	12·5	...	...	50	50
	(c) Testers	1	..	..	...	...	...	..	1	...	..	...	...	...	100	...	...	100
	(d) Compounder ...	1	...	...	1	..	...	...	...	..	..	..	100	...	...	...	...	100
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents and Head Clerks, permanent.	30	2	4	9	2	11	1	...	...	1	6·6	43·3	43·3	3·4	3·4	23·3	76·7
	(b) Clerks and Storekeepers, permanent.	294	6	45	64	19	126	3	26	...	5	2·2	36·7	49·3	9·8	2	22·8	77·2
	(c) Head clerks (not on the regular cadre).	8	...	...	1	1	6	...	...	...	...	...	12·5	87·5	...	...	12·5	87·5
	(d) Clerks and Storekeepers (not on the regular cadre).	50	1	5	5	3	32	...	1	1	2	2	20	70	2	6	18	82
	GRAND TOTAL ...	697	26	113	131	32	308	15	59	1	12	3·7	35	48·8	10·6	1·9	23·1	76·9

PART II—TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS—*concluded.*

A.—Ministry of Agriculture.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE ON COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
6. Public Works Department Hydro-Electric Branch.	(a) Tunnel Engineer, Store Officer, Transmission Line Engineer, Personal Assistant and Resident Engineer.	5	4	...	...	..	1	...	...	...	..	80	...	20	...	...	...	100
	(b) Apprentice Engineers ...	9	...	1	4	...	3	...	...	...	1	...	55·6	33·3	...	11·1	11	89
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Overseers and Sub-Overseers.	58	2	16	10	...	17	5	7	...	1	3·5	44·8	29·3	20·7	1·7	36	64
	(b) Foremen and Assistant Foremen.	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	..	..	...	...	100	...	..	.	100
	(c) Draftmen	27	...	8	11	...	6	...	1	...	1	...	70·4	22·2	3·7	8·7	29	71
	(d) Tracers	11	...	1	6	...	4	...	...	..	...	...	63·6	36·4	...	...	9	91
	(e) Storekeepers and Assistant Storekeepers.	11	...	1	3	3	4	...	..	..	...	...	36·3	63·7	...	..	36	64
	(f) T. L. Superintendents and Linesmen.	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	..	...	...	100
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	4	1	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	25	75	...	..	..	...	100

	(b) Head clerks and 2nd clerks.	11		1	4	...	5	.	1	...	..	...	45·5	45·5	9	...	9	91
	(c) Clerks	75	...	17	13	2	33	2	6	...	2	..	40	46·7	10·7	2·6	28	72
	GRAND TOTAL ...	213	7	45	54	5	75	7	15	...	5	2·3	46·5	37·5	10·3	2·4	26·8	73·2
7. Excise Department	(a) Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors.	159	...	46	14	10	56	12	17	1	3	...	37·7	41·5	18·3	2·5	43·4	56·6
	GRAND TOTAL ..	159	...	46	14	10	56	12	17	1	3	...	37·7	41·5	18·3	2·5	43·4	56·6

PART II—Transferred Departments—*continued.*

B.—Ministry of Education.

PART II—TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS.

B.—*Ministry of Education.*

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE ON COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments	Europeans and Anglo-Indians	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
1. Education Department.	Special posts	17	15	.	...	...	...	...	..	...	2	88	...	..	...	12	..	100
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(a) Punjab Educational service (Men's Branch).	99	1	22	16	2	39	3	12	.	4	1	38	42	15	4	27	73
	(b) Punjab Educational service (Women's Branch).	6	3	..	1	...	...	..	...	...	2	50	17	.	...	33	...	100
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Subordinate Educational service (A.-V. Section).	96[illegible]	...	248	116	63	412	49	71	2	8	...	38	49	12	1	37	63
	(b) Subordinate Educational service (Cl. and V. Section).	852		287	173	65	228	45	53	...	1	...	54	35	11	..	47	53
	(c) Subordinate Educational service (Women's Branch A.-V. Section).	72	2	1	1	...	...	.	...	6	62	3	3	...	..	94	10	90
	(d) Subordinate Educational service (Women's Branch—Cl. and V. Section).	123	1	14	38	6	43	2	6	..	13	1	42	40	6	11	17	83
	(e) Miscellaneous posts ...	64	25	6	6	1	13	1	5	...	7	39	19	22	9	11	13	87

	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents and Head Clerks (D. P. I.'s Office).	7	2	1	...	...	2	...	...	1	1	29	14	29	.	28	28·5	71·5
	(b) Clerks (D. P. I.'s Office)	49	2	10	17	3	10	3	4	..		4	55	27	14	...	33	67
	(c) Superintendents and Head Clerks (subordinate offices).	37	..	12	6	1	16	.	2	...		..	49	46	5	...	35	65
	(d) Clerks (subordinate offices).	176	...	71	25	10	53	4	11	.	2	...	55	35	9	1	49	52
	Grand Total ...	2,471	51	672	399	151	816	107	164	9	102	2·1	43·3	39·1	11	4·5	38	62
	Special posts	9	2	...	...	...	4	1	1	...	1	22·2	...	44·5	22·2	11·1	11·1	88·9
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
2. Department of Industries.	(a) Punjab Educational Service.	2		..	...	...	2	.	..	.	...	...	...	100	..	..	..	100
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Industrial Surveyors, Teachers, Experts, etc.	209	1	49	58	14	60	6	16	1	4	·5	51·2	35·3	10·5	2·5	33·5	66·5
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents and Head Clerks.	8		...	...	..	7	1	.	..	...	..	...	87·5	12·5	...	12·5	87·5
	(b) Clerks	45	...	5	6	1	29	1	3	...	...	...	24·4	66·7	8·9	...	15·6	84·4
	GRAND TOTAL ...	273	3	54	64	15	102	9	20	1	5	1·1	43·2	42·9	10·6	2·2	23·9	71·1
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
3. Central Museum ...	(a) Darogha Head Clerk ...	1	...	...	.	1	...	.	..	...	..		...	100	...	...	100	...
	(b) Clerks	3	...	1	.	1	1	...	.	...	...	..	33	67	..	...	67	33
	OTHER ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Label writer ...	2	...	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	..	50	50	...	...	...	100
	(b) Carpenter .	1	...	...	...	..	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	100	..	...	100
	GRAND TOTAL ...	7	...	1	1	2	2	...	1	...	..	...	29	57	14	...	43	57

PART II—*concluded.*

Transferred Departments.

C.—Ministry of Local Self-Government.

PART II—TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS – *contd.*

C.—*Ministry of Local Self-Government.*

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE ON COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointment.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural tribes.	Others.
1. Medical Department	Special posts	6	...	1	1	...	4	...	...	...	...	...	33·3	66·7	...	...	16·6	83·4
	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(*a*) Civil Surgeons ...	9	...	2	1	1	4	...	1	...	...	...	33·3	55·5	11·2	...	33·3	66·7
	(*b*) Civil Assistant Surgeons	143	...	18	13	6	78	8	13	...	7	...	21·7	68·7	14·7	4·9	22·4	77·6
	(*c*) Women Assistant Surgeons	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	50	50	...	100
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(*a*) Sub-Assistant Surgeons	657	...	103	53	29	386	46	67	...	3	...	22·7	60·4	16·4	·5	25·9	74·1
	(*b*) Women Assistant Surgeons	4	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	3	...	...	25	...	75	...	100
	(*c*) Nurses	67	67	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(*d*) Laboratory Assistants and Attendants.	49	...	12	10	8	17	...	1	...	1	...	44·8	51	2·1	2·1	40·8	59·2
	(*e*) Miscellaneous appointments.	19	4	3	3	1	5	3	...	...	...	21	31·6	31·6	15·	...	36·8	63·2
	(*f*) Dispensers ...	169	...	16	36	21	78	7	7	...	4	...	30·8	58·6	8·3	2·3	26·1	73·9
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(*a*) Superintendents and Head Clerks.	40	1	6	3	...	25	2	2	...	1	2·5	22·5	62·5	10	2·5	20	80
	(*b*) Clerks ...	107	...	15	14	11	56	4	6	...	1	...	27·1	62·7	9·3	·9	28	72
	GRAND TOTAL ...	1,302	72	175	134	77	655	70	98	...	21	5·5	23·8	56·2	12·9	1·6	24·7	75·3

2. Public Health Department.	PROVINCIAL SERVICE.																	
	(a) Assistant Directors of Public Health.	3	...	...	2	...	1		...	...	...	...	66·7	33·3	...	...	...	100
	(b) District Medical Officers of Health.	31	...	1	4	2	16	2	6	...	...	...	16·1	53·1	25·8	...	16·1	83·9
	SUBORDINATE SERVICE.																	
	(a) Vaccinators (District Staff)	65	...	19	10	4	28	3	1	...	...	...	44·6	49·2	6·2	...	40	60
	(b) Vaccinators (Special Staff)	17	...	8	1	4	3	...	1	...	...	...	52·9	41·2	5·9	...	70·6	29·4
	(c) Sub-Assistant Surgeons	24	...	7	1	3	8	4	1	...	...	...	33·4	45·8	20·8	...	58·3	41·7
	(d) Sanitary Inspectors (Normal Staff).	28	...	5	2	3	15	...	3	...	...	...	25	64·3	10·7	...	28·6	71·4
	(e) Dispensers ...	20	...	1	4	3	10	...	2	...	...	...	25	65	10	...	20	80
	TECHNICAL APPOINTMENTS.																	
	(a) Chemist	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(b) Auditor, Urban Sanitary Board.	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(c) Photographer ...	2	...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	50	50
	(d) Draftsman ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	(e) Laboratory Assistants and attendants.	7	...	5	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	85·7	14·3	...	...	71·4	28·6
	(f) Storekeeper ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100
	(g) Mistri	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	100
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Superintendents ...	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...	100
	(b) Head Assistant and Head Clerks.	8	...	5	1	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	75	12·5	12·5	...	62·5	37·5
	(c) Stenographers ...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	..	100
	(d) Clerks ...	28	...	6	5	1	14	...	2	...	...	...	39·3	53·6	7·1	...	21	75
	GRAND TOTAL ...	2 1	3	59	32	20	100	9	13	...	...	1·2	37·3	42·8	11·2	..	33·5	63·5

PART II—TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS—*concld.*

C.—Ministry of Local Self-Government—concld.

1	2	3	4	5								6					7	
				INDIANS.								PERCENTAGE TO COLUMN 3.					PERCENTAGE OF COLUMN 3.	
				Muslims.		*Hindus.*		*Sikhs.*		*Others.*								
Name of Office or Department.	Nature of appointment.	Total number of appointments.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.	Europeans and Anglo-Indians.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.	Members of notified Agricultural Tribes.	Others.
3. Registration Department.	(a) Departmental Sub-Registrars.	61	...	31	...	9	3	16	2	...	...	...	50·8	19·7	29·5	...	91·8	8·2
	GRAND TOTAL ...	61	...	31	...	9	3	16	2	...	...	...	50·8	19·7	29·5	...	91·8	8·2
Office of the Joint Secretary to Government, Punjab, Transferred Departments.	Tahsildar on Special Duty ...	1	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	100	...
	CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Personal Assistant ...	1	...	...	...	...	...	..	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	100	...	100
	(b) Head Assistant ...	1	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	100
	(c) Clerks ...	11	...	3	4	...	2	...	2	...	...	...	63·6	18·2	18·2	...	27·3	72·7
	OTHER ESTABLISHMENT.																	
	(a) Naib Tahsildar ...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	100	...	...	[illegible]	[illegible]
	(b) Kanungos ...	3	...	...	1	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	33·3	...	66·7	...	[illegible]	[illegible]
	GRAND TOTAL ...	18	...	4	6	...	3	1	3	...	1	...	55·5	16·7	22·2	5·6	27·8	72·2